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In Search of a New Pantheon: 
Hero and Leader Cults in Early Soviet Russia 
FrithjofBenjamin Schenk 
Analyzing hero and leader cults in early Soviet Russia one has to deal with two 
paradoxical findings. Firstly, one is struck by the pure existence of institutiona-
lized veneration of "great men" in a country whose founders had declared 
historical materialism to be one pillar of their ideology and whose political 
philosophers tried to make us believe that the historical process is not shaped by 
individuals but by productive forces and class conflicts. Secondly, one is 
surprised after having taken a closer look at the most important and best-known 
example of leader cults in early Soviet Russia: the cult of Lenin. How comes -
one cannot avoid to ask - that the practices, language and the symbolism which 
shaped this cult resemble so much the practices, language and symbolism of 
Orthodox christianity which the new regime had declared to overcome and to 
destroy? 
This article tries to take a closer look at the emergence and the characteristics of 
hero and leader cults in early Soviet Russia. The period covered lasts from 
February, 1917 until the end of the 1920s when the Lenin cult was already 
waning and set apart by the emerging cult of Stalin. Although hero- and leader-
cults in Soviet Russia stand in the centre of analysis, the events following the 
February Revolution must also be put into the picture. Despite the fact that the 
Bolsheviks broke with the political institutions of the provisional govemment, 
they inherited much of the symbolic repertoire, which had already been 
developed before they came to power. Thus decisive questions conceming the 
transformation of Russia's pantheon were discussed and answered already 
before the proceedings of"Red October." 
In the first part of this article some aspects of the symbolic system of the Ancien 
Regime that was overthrown and destroyed during the revolutions of 1917 have 
to be briefly described. Of particular interest in this context are the various 
forms of veneration of "great men" (members of the ruling elite, Orthodox saints 
and Russian national heroes) during the reign of the Romanovs which were on 
the one hand challenged by the iconoclastic currents of the revolutions and 
which formed on the other hand one part of the cultural legacy the builders of 
the new order had to deal with. In a second step the analysis will focus on the 
development ofhero and leader cults after February, 1917. In particular the cult 
of the victims of the February revolution, Lenin's project of "monumental 
propaganda" in 1918 and the development of the Lenin cult will be analyzed as 
examples of the heroic veneration of outstanding individuals after the fall of the 
old order. A third and final part is devoted to the discussion of the complicated 
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and to a certain extend contradictory relationship between the two cultural 
systems of Bolshevism and Orthodox Christianity. Comparing the various 
manifestations of the Lenin cult with the veneration of saints in the Orthodox 
Church one is struck at first glance. by a number of obvious parallels and 
similarities. Nevertheless the structural differences between the adoration of the 
Bolshevik leader and the worship of Orthodox saints seem to be of even higher 
importance. The new regime inherited a number of reli_gious elements from ~re-
revolutionary Russian culture but embedded them m a completely rev1sed 
context of meanings and practices. 
lconoclasm: The Destruction of the Old Pantheon 
It is a weil known and undisputed fact that the Russian revolutions of February 
and October 1917 were not only targeted at the political institutions of the old 
regime but ~ried at the same time to overthrow its detested system of signs, 
symbols and rituals. The official ideological trinity introduced in Russia during 
the reign of Nikolas I. of "autocracy, orthodoxy and nationality" ("samoderzha~ 
vie, pravoslavie, narodnost"') feil victim to the builders of the new o~der. 
Whilst the engineers of the February uprising tried to replace the old fash1o~ed 
triad with the French model of "liberte, egalite et fratemite" the B0lshev1ks 
propagated their trinity compounded of "dictatorship of the proletariat, atheism, 
and intemationalism." In both cases the foundations ofthe symbolic order ofthe 
autocratic regime were challenged and finally destroyed. 
The rejection of the old symbolic order of "autocracy, orthodoxy and nationa-
lity" during the revolutions of 1917 affected in particular the three c~rrespo_n-
ding systems of cults of outstanding individuals: The cult of the Tsar, h1s family 
and his predecessors, the cult of Russian orthodox saints and the veneration of 
Russian national heroes. 
On the concept of „official nationality" in pre-revolutionary Russia see Nicholas V. 
Riasanovsky, Nicholas I. and Official Nationality in Russia 1825-1855, Berkeley/Los 
Angeles 1959; Nataniel Knight, Ethnicity, Nationality and the Masses: Narodnost' and 
Modemity in Imperial Russia, in: Russian Modemity: Politics, Knowledge, PractJces, ed. 
by David L. Hoffmann and Yanni Kotsonis, New York_2000, pp. 41-65; Maureen Perne, 
Narodnost': Notions ofNational ldentity, in: Constructmg Russian Culture m the Age of 
Revolution 1881-1940, ed. by Catriona Kelly and David Shepherd, Oxford 1998, pp. 28-
36; Andrej Zorin, Ideologija „pravoslavija - samoderzavija - narodnosti": opyt 
rekonstrukcii, in: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie 26 (1997), pp. 71-104; A. Zonn, Kormia 
dvuglavnogo orla. Literatura i gosudartvennaia ideologiia v Rossii v poslednej treti 
XVIII - pervoi treti XIX veka, Moskva 2001. 
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Autocracy (samoderzhavie) 
Besides the abstract symbols of the imperial state (like the double headed eagle, 
the national flag, or the national anthem) the portraits of the emperor and his 
family and the various monuments depicting the emperor and his predecessors 
represented in the Russian symbolic space the first principle of the ideological 
triad: autocracy. 2 So it is not at all surprising that most of the iconoclasm of the 
F ebruary revolution was targeted against these symbols of the abhorred regime: 
the double headed eagle was chipped of public buildings and institutions, the 
portraits of the Tsar and his family were removed from public schools. The 
monument to Alexander III. on Znamenskaia square in Petrograd, fondly called 
"hippopotamus" by the citizens of Petrograd, was conquered on February 24 and 
decorated with red flags and banners displaying revolutionary watchwords. In 
March, 1917 the city Duma of Petrograd decided to rename squares and streets 
which reminded ofthe Tsars Alexander or Nicholas.3 
Surprisingly a !arge number of statues, institutions or buildings, which 
symbolized no less than others the principle of autocracy - like for example the 
monuments to Nicholas I. or to Peter the Great in Petrograd - were not harmed 
neither by the iconoclastic strikes of F ebruary nor by those of October, 1917 .4 In 
April, 1918 the Bolshevik govemment issued a decree on the dismantling of 
monuments raised to honor monarchs and their servitors. The order was not only 
slowly executed but from the beginning exempted those monuments in public 
space which possessed a certain historical or artistic value. Lenin personally 
ordered to take down the statue of Alexander III. in Moscow, who had been 
particularly repugnant to revolutionaries. This example of Bolshevik iconoclasm 
became soon afterwards an integral part of Soviet cultural memory thanks to 
Sergei Eisenstein who integrated parts of documentaries showing the scene in 
his famous film "October - Ten days that Shook the World." Whereas the giant 
statue of Alexander III. in Moscow was tom down by revolutionaries, the 
monument to the Tsar in Petrograd on Znamenskaia square remained untouched. 
The detested equestrian statue was removed from public space not earlier than 
1937 and preserved in a yard of the Russian Museum in Leningrad. The 
authorities were very modest in their campaign to "de-romanovize" the Russian 
cities. Surprisingly towns which were marked by their denominations as lieu de 
2 On the symbolic dimension of Russian autocracy see: Michael Cherniavsky, Tsar and 
People. Studies in Russian Myths, New Haven 1961; Richard S. Wortman, Scenarios of 
Power. Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy, vol. 1: From Peter the Great to the 
Death of Nicholas 1., Princeton 1995; vol. 2: From Alexander II to the Abdication of 
Nicholas II, Princeton 2000. 
3 Interpreting the Russian Revolution. The Language and Symbols of 1917, ed. by Orlando 
Figes and Boris Kolonitskii, New Haven 1999, pp. 48-57. 
4 Richard Stites, Iconoclastic Currents in the Russian Revolution: Destroying and 
Preserving the Past, in: Bolshevik Culture, ed. by A. Gleason, P. Kenez and R. Stiles, 
Bloomington 1985, pp. 1-24, cf. pp. 6-10. 
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memoire of the tsarist regime, like Caricyn (later: Stalingrad), Elizavetgrad 
(later: Zinov'evsk) or Ekaterinburg (later: Sverdlovsk) were given new, 
Bolshevik names not earlier than 1924 or 1925 respectively. All these examples 
show that the symbols of the autocratic order apparently had not completely lost 
their symbolic value among the masses after 1917 and not even when the 
Bolsheviks had consolidated their power after the end of the Civil War in 1921. 
Orthodoxy (pravoslavie) 
The second complex of worship of outstanding individuals, which was - in the 
eyes of the builders of the new regime - deeply connected with the darkness of 
the past, was the veneration of saints in the Orthodox Church.5 Whilst these 
religious practises remained mostly untouched during and after the February 
revolution, the Bolsheviks spent a lot of energy to fight against the adulation of 
Orthodox miracle workers, holy princes and fools in Christ. The first assault 
against the worship of saints was the abolition of the old calendar with its 
holydays and Christian feasts, and its replacement with a new "Red calendar."6 
The second strike was targeted against the tradition of Christian baptism which 
was planned to be replaced by a new socialist ritual called "Oktiabrina." True 
Bolsheviks were supposed to give names like "Revoliutsia," "Fevralina" or 
"Vladlen" (derived from "Vladimir Lenin") to their newbom children and 
refrain from baptising them in the name of that saint whose holiday .was 
celebrated on the child's birthday.7 Tue third aspect of orthodox veneration of 
outstanding individuals which was criticized harshly by the Bolsheviks was the 
5 On the attitude ofthe Bolsheviks towards the Orthodox Church cf. Richard Pipes, Russia 
under the Bolshevik Regime 1917-1924, London 1997, pp. 337 and foll.; Hans-Heinrich 
Nolte, Die Glaubensgemeinschaften und die Religionspolitik des Staates, in: Handbuch 
der Geschichte Rußlands, vol. 3/11, Von den autokratischen Reformen zum Sowjetstaat, 
ed. by. G. Schramm, Stuttgart 1992, pp. 1709-1741; Richard Stites, Revolutionary 
Dreams. Utopian Vision and Experimental Life in the Russian Revolution, New York 
1989, pp. 105 and foll.; Stefan Plaggenborg, Revolutionskultur. Menschenbilder und 
kulturelle Praxis in Sowjetrußland zwischen Oktoberrevolution und Stalinismus, 
Köln/Weimar/Wien 1996, pp. 289 and foll.; Michael V. Shkarovskiy, Die russische 
Kirche unter Stalin in den 20er und 30er Jahren des 20. Jahrhunderts, in: Stalinismus vor 
dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. Neue Wege der Forschung, ed. by Manfred Hildermeier, 
München 1998, pp. 233-254. 
6 Malte Rolf, Constructing a Soviet Time: Bolshevik Festivals and their Rivals during the 
First Five-Y ear Plan. A Study of the Central Black Earth Region, in: Kritika. 
Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 1,3 (2000), pp. 447-474; M. Rolf, Feste 
des „roten Kalenders": der große Umbruch und die sowjetische Ordnung der Zeit, in: 
Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 49 (2001 ), pp. 101-118; E. E. Keller, Prazdnicnaja 
kul'tura Peterburga. Ocerki istorii, St. Petersburg 2001, pp. 126-148. 
7 Rene Fülöp-Miller, Geist und Gesicht des Bolschewismus. Darstellung und Kritik des 
kulturellen Lebens in Sowjet-Rußland, Zürich/Leipzig/Wien 1926, pp. 258-62; Stiles, 
Iconoclastic Currents, p. 9. 
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veneration of holy relics. The belief in miraculous corpses was exposed to 
ridicule at many places and confronted with scientific explanations about the 
reasons why a human body does not decay under certain circumstances.8 
Nationality (narodnost') 
Tue deconstruction of cults of remarkable historical individuals which were 
linked with the ideology of Russian nationalism was the easiest task of the 
revolutionaries to fulfill. There were hardly any monuments for national heroes 
in Russian public space which could have been tom down. Those which existed, 
like for example the monument of Minin and Pozharskii on Red square in 
Moscow remained untouched in most of the cases. At the same time, it was an 
easy exercise to ban all national heroes and individuals from history textbooks 
and to reconstruct the historical narrative according to the scientific laws of 
historical materialism. According to the new paradigm of Bolshevik 
historiography and its "doyen" Mikhail Nikolaevich Pokrovskii, not individuals 
had shaped the historical process but classes and productive forces. 9 Lenin 
personally sanctioned the new "general line" of Bolshevik historiography. So 
not the construction of a new pantheon but the deconstruction of the old one 
seemed to be the main concem of the Bolsheviks immediately after they came to 
power. But this is of course not the whole story. In fact right after the February 
revolution the emergence of new hero- and leader-cults which resembled often 
the traditional forms of the veneration of the Tsars, orthodox saints, and Russian 
national idols could be observed. Both the veneration and mystification of the 
political leader and the identification of outstanding individuals and their 
invocation as "martyrs" and "heroes" remained important pattems of the 
political culture und communication in Russia after February, 1917. 
The veneration of heroes and political leaders after F ebruary, 1917 
The appearance of leader cults after the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II. had at 
least two reasons. 1° First, in a political atmosphere where law had lost its status 
8 
9 
Fülöp-Miller, Geist und Gesicht des Bolschewismus, pp. 249-252. 
On Pokrovskii see Paul H. Aron, M. N. Pokrovskii and the Impact of the First Five-Year 
Plan on Soviet Historiography, in: Essays in Russian and Soviel History, ed. by J. S. 
Curtiss, Leiden 1963, pp. 283-302; George M. Enteen, Michail Nikolaevich Pokrovskii, 
in: The Modem Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviel History, vol. 28, Gulf Breeze/FI. 
1982, pp. 167-171; A. A. Chemobaev, Michail Nikolaevich Pokrovskii (1868-1932), in: 
lstoriki Rossii XVIII-XX vekov, ed. by A. A. Chemobaev, vyp. 2-i, Moskva 1995, pp. 
51-61; A. N. Artizov and M. N. Pokrovskii, Final kar'ery - uspekh ili porazhenie? in: 
Otechestvennaia istoriia, 1998, 1, pp. 77-96. 
10 On the notion of "leader cult" in the context of modern Russian and Soviet history see E. 
A. Rees, Leader Cults: Varieties, Preconditions and Functions, in: The Leader Cult in 
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as a source for the legitimization of political power the "personal authority of 
the revolutionary leader - his public image - acquired real importance." Second, 
"most of the common people still conceived of politics in monarchical terms." 11 
Among the revolutionary masses one could observe a "quasi religious faith in 
the moral qualities and divine power of the people's chosen leader and national 
saviour."12 But not only the frontmen of the revolutionary movement became 
objects of mystification and public devotion. Apparently there was also a 
widespread need among the revolutionary elites and masses to commemorate 
and honour those who had given their Jives for the sake of the revolution. 
The Cult ofthe Martyrs ofthe February Revolution 
The glorious veneration of the victims of the February revolution in Petrograd 
can be considered as a first example of revolutionary hero cult in post-Romanov 
Russia. 13 The funeral of 184 martyrs of the street fighting on March 23 on the 
Communist Dictatorships. Stalin and the Eastern Bloc, ed. by Balazs Apor, Jan C. 
Behrends, Polly Jones and E. A. Rees, Houndmills 2004, pp. 3-26; Heidi Hein-Kircher, 
Führerkult und Führermythos. Theoretische Reflexionen zur Einführung, in: Der Führer 
im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts, ed. by Benno Ennker et al., Marburg 2010, pp. 3-26; 
Daniel Ursprung, Inszeniertes Charisma. Personenkult im Sozialismus, in: Charisma und 
Herrschaft. Führung und Verführung in der Politik, ed. by Berit Bliesemann de Guevara 
et al, Frankfurt 2011, pp. 151-176. 
11 Figes, Kolonitskii, Interpreting the Russian Revolution, p. 89. 
12 Ibid, p. 103. - The question of the historical roots of Soviet leader cults is highly 
contested among scholars. Jan Plamper and other experts on the Stalin cult and its 
emergence in the late 1920s argue for example that one should not overemphasise the 
pre-revolutionary tradition of veneration of „great men" in the Orthodox Church. See Jan 
Plamper, Introduction: Modem Personality Cults, in: Personality Cults in Stalinism -
Personenkulte im Stalinismus, ed. by Klaus Heller and Jan Plamper, Göttingen 2004, pp. 
13-42. Plamper declares Soviel "personality cults" tobe phenomena of the "modern era" 
which are embedded more in a "Western tradition of modern [i.e. secular] personality 
cults" than in a tradition of "etemal Russian mysticism-cum-authoritarianism, embodied 
in the twin institutions of tsardom and the Russian Orthodox Church." (21) Plamper 
admits the importance of the legacies of pre-revolutionary monarchical cults, the 
veneration of leaders in intelligentsia circles in nineteenth century Russia and the 
tradition of patemalism in Russia for the development of Soviet leader cults. At the same 
time he downplays the impact of Christian tradition and the explanation of Soviel leader 
cults to be an "ersatz tool to generate political support among the popular masses" (21 ). 
The argument of "continuities of the Stalin cult to Russian Orthodoxy ( ... ) glosses over 
all the new and different sources that combine to make up the Stalin cult." (39). 
13 According to Figes and Kolonitskii after the February Revolution a significant leader cult 
emerged around Prime Minister Kerensky. They even call this cult „the most important 
factor in Russian political life." Figes, Kolonitskii, Interpreting the Russian Revolution, 
p. 87. -An example ofrevolutionary hero cult in Tsarist Russia was the veneration ofthe 
Bolshevik fighter Nikolai Bauman who was killed in 1905 by right wing activists of the 
"black hundreds" and whose funeral in Moscow on October 20 (old style) attracted 
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Field of Mars attracted more than 800,000 people from all parts of the capital. 14 
The day of the funeral was declared a national holiday, all shops were closed 
the canons ofthe Peter-and-Paul-fortress saluted 184 times during the ceremony'. 
This gathering was not only impressive in terms of mass attendance. lt was also 
the first secular outdoor ceremony ever in Russian history. The funeral was a 
true manifestation ofthe democratic values ofthe new order. No priests attended 
the meeting and no religious hymns were sung. Ten days before the arrival of 
Lenin in Petrograd there was no charismatic leader yet who used the ceremony 
for, own propaganda purposes. The crowd proclaimed revolutionary songs and 
promised the victims "who feil during the fight against Tsarism" on their 
banners "etemal glory" ("Vechnaia slava pavshim v bor'be protiv tsarizma"). 15 
As a reference to the French Revolution an "altar of the cult of the revolution" 
was erected on the Field of Mars in Petrograd. The ground itself was renamed 
"Square of the victims of the revolution" and became one of the most important 
sites on the new symbolic map of Petrograd. 16 lt was here where 191 7 the first 
legal Russian demonstration on the first of May took place. And it was already 
on that very day where one could observe the attempt of the Bolsheviks to 
appropriate the political symbols of the February revolution. Lenin did not miss 
the chance to address a speech to the people who gathered on the Field of Mars 
on first of May, 1917, elaborating on the importance of this holiday and on the 
tasks of the Russian revolution. From now on the mass grave of the victims of 
the revolution became the final destination of Bolshevik manifestations in the 
capital on the first of May, starting at the Smolny Institute, passing the Winter 
Palace and ending up on the Field ofMars. 17 
The final step marking the complete adoption of the symbolic space of the Field 
of Mars by the Bolsheviks was the funeral of Moisei S. Uritskii in September, 
1918 who had been killed by Social Revolutionaries in August that year. This 
first big Bolshevik funeral marked the transformation of the Field of Mars into 
one of the central sites of Bolshevik hero cult in Soviet Russia. 18 So it is not 
surprising that the monument erected for the martyrs of the Revolution was 
unveiled on the second anniversary of the October Revolution on November 7, 
around 100.000 sympathizers. See Maurice Baring, A Y ear in Russia, New York 1917 
(Reprint 1981 ), pp. 30-31; Orlando Figes, Die Tragödie eines Volkes. Die Epoche der 
russischen Revolution 1891 bis 1924, München 2001, p. 214. 
14 Richard Stites, The Origins of Soviel Ritual Style: Symbol and Festival in the Russian 
Revolution, in: Symbols of Power. The Esthetics of Political Legitimation in the Soviel 
Union and Eastem Europe, ed. by Claes Arvidsson and Lars Erik Blomqvist, Stockholm 
1987, pp. 23-42, in particular pp. 26-27. 
15 V. S. Shvarts, Arkhitektumyi ansambl' Marsova Polia, Leningrad 1989, p. 161. 
16 Figes, Kolonitskii, Interpreting the Russian Revolution, p. 30. 
17 Stiles, The Origins of Soviel Ritual Style, p. 31. 
18 Richard Stiles, Bolshevik Ritual Building in the 1920s, in: Russia in the Era of NEP. 
Explorations in Soviel Society and Culture, ed. by Sheila Fitzpatrick, A. Rabinovich and 
Richard Stiles, Indiana 1996, pp. 295-309, 303-4. 
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1919 and not on March 23. Eight epitaphs, written by the first peoples' com-
missar of Enlightenment, Anatolii Lunacharskii, were added to the monument 
that was designed by the later famous architect Lev Vladimirovich Rudnev. 19 In 
these short texts the martyrs of the revolution are praised not as victims but as 
"heroes" who died a "beautiful death" (umirali prekrasno). 20 Their martyrdom is 
presented in the tradition of the sacrifice of the fighters of the French 
Revolution, the European rebellions of 1848 and the Paris Commune. They are 
promised (once more) an "etemal life (v narode zhiv vechno)" in the memory of 
the people since they gave their life for the "common cause" ("V narode zhiv 
vechno kto dlia naroda zhizn' polozhil, trudilsia, borolsia i umer za obshchee 
delo"). 21 The promise of etemal life in the collective memory of the people is a 
weil known pattem of national memorials from the nineteenth century and 
therefore no specificity of Bolshevik symbolic practices.22 Nevertheless, it is 
remarkable that these national and secular promises of an etemal life after death 
were adopted by Bolsheviks and fitted in their discourses about revolutionary 
heroes and martyrs. 
Lenin' s Programme of Monumental Propaganda 
Whilst the monument for the victims of the revolution on the Field of Mars in 
Petrograd can be interpreted as a result of institutionalization of the memory of a 
certain social group Lenin's programme of "Monumental propaganda" 
definitely was an attempt to expose an invented historical narrative of the 
Bolshevik revolution and to establish a new revolutionary pantheon in Soviet 
Russia. 23 On April 12, 1918, when Lenin issued the decree, commanding the 
19 Shvarts, Arkhitekturnyi ansambl' Marsova Polia, pp. 164-176. 
20 Ibid, p. 174. 
21 lbid, p. 174. 
22 See for example Der politische Totenkult. Kriegerdenkmäler in der Modeme, ed. by 
Reinhard Kosellek and Michael Jeismann, München 1994; Manfred Hettling, Totenkult 
statt Revolution. 1848 und seine Opfer, Frankfurt am Main 1998; Olaf B. Rader, Grab 
und Herrschaft. Politischer Totenkult von Alexander dem Großen bis Lenin, München 
2003. 
23 Stiles, The Origins of Soviel Ritual Style, pp. 33-35; John Bowlt, Russian Sculpture and 
Lenin's Plan of Monumental Propaganda, in: Art and Architecture in the Service of 
Politics, ed. by H. A. Milton and L. Nochlin, Cambridge 1978, pp. 182-193; Pipes, 
Russia under the Bolshevik Regime, p. 314; Mikhail German, Serdtsem slushaia 
revoliutsiiu. Iskusstvo pervykh Jet oktiabria, Leningrad 1977, pp. 8-12; Plaggenborg, 
Revolutionskultur, pp. 247 and foll.; Robert Russell, The Artsand the Russian Civil War, 
in: Journal for European Studies 20 (1990), pp. 219-240, cf. pp. 223-225; Monica 
Rüthers, Moskau bauen. Von Lenin bis Chruscev, Wien 2007, pp. 78-79; Bettina Jugen, 
Rußlands Hang zum Monumentalen: Sowjetische Propaganda in den Jahren nach der 
Oktoberrevolution, in: Kultur, Macht, Gesellschaft. Beiträge des Promotionskollegs Ost-
West, ed. by Anne Hartmann et al., Münster 2003, pp. 197-212. 
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removal of tsarist monuments from Russian cities, he ordered - on the other 
hand - the erection of new busts and monuments for the heroes and revolu-
tionaries of the European and Russian history. The whole idea of "monumental 
propaganda" was inspired by a book, written in the seventeenth-century by the 
Dominican Tomaso di Campanella. His utopian "City of the Sun" is decorated 
with busts of national heroes and its walls covered with edifying frescoes. 
Lenin was fascinated by this idea and asked commissar Lunacharskii to compile 
a !ist of suitable persons for a respective Bolshevik pantheon. The communist 
leader wanted to .use the new monuments as tools of propaganda to 
communicate with the urban masses and as a means of historical legitimization 
of the Russian revolution. Despite the fact that Lunacharskii remained very 
reserved regarding the whole idea, a !ist of potential members of the new 
pantheon was compiled and approved in July, 1918. lt included 63 persons taken 
from ancient history (for example Spartacus), from the history of the French 
Revolution (like Marat, Robespierre and Danton), from the history of socialism 
in Europe (for example Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Karl Liebknecht and Rosa 
Luxemburg) and last but not least from Russian revolutionary history (like 
Peste]' and Radishchev). According to Lunacharskii, Lenin's intention was that 
those persons honoured by monuments should be "the precursors of socialism or 
theoreticians and fighters for socialism, and also those luminaries ofphilosophy, 
science, art etc. who, while having no direct connection with socialism, were 
nevertheless real heroes of culture."24 
On October 6, 1918 the first bust of Radishchev was erected in Moscow, in 
early November statues for Robespierre, Shevchenko, Nikitin and others 
followed. On the first anniversary of the October Revolution - November 7, 
1918 - Lenin personally unveiled a monument for Marx and Engels on the 
square of the Revolution in Moscow. On the first of May, 1919 Lenin took part 
in the ceremony when a statue for the seventeenth-century rebel Stepan Razin 
was presented to the public. So it was Lenin himself who showed the party and 
the people how to revere their historical heroes and leaders.25 
The project of monumental propaganda was an initiative promoted by the very 
top of the political hierarchy. The population met it with great reservations. 
Progressive artists of the avant-garde disliked the traditional shape of some of 
the busts. Meanwhile more conservative contemporaries detested some 
monuments for their futuristic profile. The whole idea, inspired by a book from 
the seventeenth century and probably stimulated by national pantheons in 
France or Germany was obviously too abstract and foreign to the Russian 
population for whom most of the depicted persons were just foreigners. So some 
24 A. V. Lunacharskii, Lenin o monumental'noi propagande, in: Vospominaniia i vpechat-
leniia, Moscow 1968, p. 198. Engl. trans. cit. accord.: Robert Russell, The Arts and the 
Russian Civil War, in: Journal for European Studies 20 (1990), p. 224. 
25 Stiles, The Origins of Soviel Ritual Style, p. 37. 
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of the newly erected monuments even feil victim to acts of spontaneous 
iconoclasm like the bust of Robespierre in Moscow, which was blown up in the 
night of November 6, 1918. The rest of the statues soon crumbled since they 
were made out of concrete or gypsum. The whole project of monumental 
propaganda disappeared as quickly as the idea had been put forward by Lenin. 
The Development ofthe Lenin Cult 
While the establishment of a new Bolshevik pantheon of dead and unknown 
heroes was a complete debacle, the cult of Lenin promised to be a more 
appropriate form of heroism in early Soviet Russia.26 The Lenin cult found its 
roots in the political culture of the Bolshevik regime and emerged despite the 
fact that Lenin rhetorically detested all kinds of cults of living political leaders. 27 
Lenin's project of monumental propaganda and the Bolshevik appropriation of 
the cult of the martyrs of the February Revolution show that he accepted the 
worship of prominent historical persons as a tool of political propaganda and 
legitimization. 28 On the other hand he harshly criticized the efforts of his 
followers and contemporaries to turn him into a "harmless icon" as he put it. 29 
When the Moscow party committee celebrated his 50th birthday on April 22, 
1920 and several high officials like Kamenev, Stalin and Lunacharskii delivered 
flattering speeches to his honor, Lenin showed up only at the very end of the 
ceremony, thanked the assembly for their greetings and for having spared him 
from listening to them. But in the meantime Lenin allowed the praise of his 
person to go on. 30 
Lenin's attitude of modesty was in fact just one part of the heroic self-image he 
was constantly constructing around his own person. Lenin himself contributed 
26 Nina Tumarkin, Lenin Lives! The Lenin Cult in Soviet Russia, Cambridge/Mass. 1983; 
Benno Ennker, Die Anfänge des Leninkults in der Sowjetunion, Köln 1997; Olga 
Velikanova, Making of an Idol: On Uses of Lenin, Göttingen 1996 (=Kritik der 
Geschichtsschreibung, 8); Olga Velinkanova, The Public Perception ofthe Cult ofLenin 
Based on Archival Materials (=Slavic studies, 6), Lampeter 2001. 
27 The Bolsheviks rejected the term „cult" (kul't) as an element of their own political 
vocabulary. The term was mainly in use as an ideological weapon to fight religious 
practices. Still in 1935 a dictionary printed in the USSR defined „kul't" as „religious 
worship of a god" and lists the „Russian Orthodox cult" as an example. D. N. Ushakov, 
Tolkovyi slovar' russkogo iazyka, vol. 1, Moscow 1935, p. 1546. Cit. cf. Plamper, 
Introduction, p. 29, n. 27. 
28 Like George Plekhanov with his book „The Role of the Individual in History" (New 
York 1940), Lenin rejected the dogma of historical materialism that individuals and 
personalities matter in the course of history much less than collectives. See Plamper, 
Introduction, p. 28. 
29 Tumarkin, Lenin Lives!, p. 90. 
30 Ibid, p. 95-104. 
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substantially to the cult ofhis own. The Bolshevik leader wished tobe perceived 
as an example for his compatriots. He wanted them to study as concentrated as 
he did and expected them to work as hard as he showed them to do. But even 
more important for the emergence of the Lenin cult is the unprecedented 
accumulation of power in the leader's hands after the events of October, 1917. 
The authority of Lenin within the party and the new state institutions was 
undisputed. He became the first party leader in history who attained already in 
lifetime a quasi God-like status. Lenin was perceived not only as the leader of 
the revolution but also as its incamation and embodiment. The identification of 
Lenin, the revolution and the new state was so strong that one of the three could 
not be imagined without the other two. 31 
Tue veneration of Lenin resembled already during his lifetime religious forms 
and practices. After having survived an attempt on his life in August, 1918 
Trotsky and Zinovev praised Lenin to be the "the leader of a new epoch" and the 
"apostle of world communism." His book "What is to be done?" was called the 
"gospel of the Iskraists." Zinovev concluded his panegyric article with the 
words: "He is really the chosen one of millions. He is the leader by the grace of 
God."32 In their articles Trotsky and Zinovev adopted and used the vocabulary 
and elements of traditional religious discourses to describe Lenin and his deeds. 
The allusions to Jesus Christ and the apostles were strong metaphors which most 
of the readers were supposed to understand. With their articles Trotsky and 
Zinovev set the frame for the further development of the Lenin cult. 
After August, 1918 the first biographies of Lenin for a broad audience were 
written and distributed, the first busts depicting the leader of the revolution were 
erected in Russia's cities and in 1919 the first village was renamed after 
Vladimir Il'ich Ulianov. On various posters Lenin was depicted as the true 
leader ofthe revolution whose hand points in the direction the country was toset 
course for. 
As the images of Lenin, the revolution and the new state hade merged into one 
already during Lenin's lifetime, a severe crisis of legitimacy seemed to be 
inevitable when the leader disappeared from the political scene due to serious 
health problems in 1923. Since Lenin was accepted as the one and only political 
leader in Soviet Russia, there was no other person who was able to step in the 
gap after Lenin had to leave his post. Being confronted with this dilemma 
Lenin's heirs in the party decided to immortalize him as a political symbol and 
to maintain his constant political presence through the institutions of a cult. 
Already in January, 1923 the term "Leninism" was invented to transform the 
writings and the political philosophy of the sick leader into a canonical 
fundament of the Bolshevik ideology. In April, 1923 the Moscow party 
31 Manfred Hildermeier, Geschichte der Sowjetunion 1917-1991. Entstehung und 
Niedergang des ersten sozialistischen Staates, München 1998, p. 324. 
32 Tumarkin, Lenin Lives!, p. 82; Ennker, Anfänge, p. 37. 
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organization decided to found the "Lenin-Institute" which was supposed to 
collect all of Lenin's writings, to prepare editions of his selected works and to 
produce canonical biographies of Lenin for the masses. While V. I. Ulianov was 
suffering from his deteriorating health condition, the political symbol "Lenin" 
was depicted as residing for ever in his teaching and his writing.33 
When Lenin finally died in January, 1924 the cult ofhis person had already been 
established and taken shape. The party had decided to preserve the leader as a 
political symbol which ought to help them to fill the vacuum of legitimacy 
which had emerged after Lenin left the political scene. After Lenin's death the 
party made a strong effort not to lose control over the image of the dead leader. 
In a communique issued on January 24 and transmitted to all regional and local 
party organizations, the Central Committee described the pattem for the national 
mouming and fixed the new canonical image of the dead leader.34 In fact, most 
of the articles published in regional newspapers on the occasion of Lenin' s death 
followed the "general line" ofthe Central Committee. 
In the article issued by the top of the party hierarchy, Lenin was praised as the 
founder ofthe Bolshevik party and the incamation ofthe proletariat. Lenin's life 
was described as a steady fight against the enemies of the working class. 
According to the official line, Lenin died as a martyr for the cause of the 
revolution. The party promised to continue the fight against its enemies. The 
article stressed that in fact Lenin did not die but was still alive in the souls of all 
the members of the Bolshevik party. The party and the entire communist family 
was imagined as a collective embodiment of Lenin. Finally the Central 
Committee promises that the party and its leaders will stick to Lenin's legacy 
and will fulfill his mission in the future. 
Again one is struck by the religious metaphors and vocabulary in the official 
discourse about Lenin. The dead leader is described as the incamation of the 
proletariat and the working class is imagined as a collective embodiment of 
Lenin. The dead leader is told to be alive in the souls of the members of the 
believing community and the collective is depicted in a constant fight against 
daemonic enemies. Apparently this was the language ordinary people 
understood. The news of Lenin's death was received in the whole country with 
great despair. The lying-in-state of Lenin in the house of the trade union in 
Moscow attracted several hundred thousand of people despite the fact that the 
outside temperature was around 40 degrees below zero and that one had to 
queue on the street for hours. In the whole country mouming meetings were 
organized and attracted millions of citizens.35 
33 Tumarkin, Lenin Lives!, pp. 120-24. 
34 Benno Ennker, Führerkult und mythisches Denken in der sowjetischen Öffentlichkeit 
1924, in: Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 44 (1996), pp. 431-455, cf. pp. 441-2. 
35 Tumarkin, Lenin Lives!, pp. 139-147. 
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Apparently the party leaders had not expected such a reaction among the 
population. The mass attendance to the mouming meetings in the whole country 
and to the lying-in-state in Moscow seemed to be true evidence that Lenin had 
the potential to function as a unifying symbol and as a bond to hold the country 
together. The unprecedented acceptance of the Lenin cult among the masses of 
the population was perceived by the regime as a unique chance to overcome its 
own political and social isolation.36 
When the party decided to preserve not only Lenin's name in the collective 
memory but also to protect his body from decay and to expose it for public 
veneration in a Mausoleum in the centre of Moscow this was due to the insight 
in the usefulness of the cult for the stability of the regime.37 One of the high 
officials of the Bolshevik party and former intimates of Lenin, Vladimir Bonch-
Bruevich, put it bluntly: "Let him after death, as in life, serve the proletarian 
cause of the working class."38 As a relic Lenin's task was to continuously 
legitimize Soviet power and mobilize the population. In fact there were a 
number of persons who expressed harsh critique over the plan not to bury 
Lenin's body - notably Lenin's wife Nadeshda Krupskaia - but their arguments 
were subordinated under the political objective to use Lenin as a unifying 
political symbol. 39 
The decision to preserve Lenin's body and to expose it to the public on the Red 
Square in Moscow was communicated to the masses as if the regime followed 
the wish of thousands of Soviet citizens. In fact just a few letters asking for the 
mummification of Lenin's body can be found in the party archives in Moscow. 
The new leaders apparently understood that loyalty and emotional attachment to 
the regime could best be secured by referring to traditional forms of adulation of 
outstanding individuals, notably to the veneration of Orthodox saints and the 
worship of the autocratic leader. That is why the various forms and expressions 
of the Lenin cult resemble so much the forms of pre-revolutionary worship of 
the political leader and Orthodox saints: Soviet children were "baptized" in the 
Name of Vladimir Il'ich (for ex. "Vladlen"), the day of his death, his dies 
natalis became a national holiday in the "Red calendar," his grave and his relics 
were made a site of attraction for international pilgrimage, his portrait was 
36 Ennker, Anfänge, pp. 330-33. 
37 On the preservation of Lenin's body and the erection of the mausoleum see N. N. 
Stoyanov, Arkhitektura Mavzoleya Lenina, Moskva 1950; Aleksej S. Abramov, 
Mavzolej Lenina, Moskva 6 1985; Jl'ja B. Zbarskij and Samuel Hutchinson, Lenin und 
andere Leichen. Mein Leben im Schatten des Mausoleums, Stuttgart 1999; Aleksej S. 
Abramov, Pravda i vymysly o kremlevskom nekropole i Mavzolee, Moskva 2005; 
Giovanni Moretto, Lenin and His Body: A Case of Soviet Religiosity, in: Religion and 
Power in Europe. Conflict and Convergence, ed. By Joaquim Camalho, Pisa 2007, pp. 
279-296. 
38 Tumarkin, Lenin Lives!, p. 179. 
39 Ibid, p. 177. 
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omnipresent in so called "Lenin corners" in public institutions and private 
houses replacing the traditional collection of holy icons. Lenin was praised as 
the incarnation of the working class and the prophet of the new era. Cities, 
factories, schools and the like were named after him. Monuments for the new 
leader mushroomed all over the country. But does this mean that the cult of 
Lenin was based on and replaced the traditional forms of veneration of 
Orthodox saints or even the entire religious symbolic system in Russia?40 
Revolution and Religion 
Before turning to the differences which can also be described when comparing 
the Lenin cult with the veneration of Orthodox saints, one should reflect on 
possible explanations for the stated similarities. In this context one has to 
distinguish the motivation of the authors of the Lenin cult from the patterns of 
its reception.41 The engineers of the Lenin cult used the vocabulary and the 
symbolic elements of traditional religious discourses not because they wanted to 
introduce a new religious system of belief or to refill the old structure with new 
content.42 lt seems more likely that they used old and broadly accepted patterns 
of communication either because they were themselves trained and socialized 
during the old regime - like the student of a seminar for Orthodox priests Josef 
40 The proponents of the theory of „political religion," like Erich Voegelin, have argued 
that the symbolic systems ofmodem totalitarian regimes, like Communism, Fascism and 
National Socialism, are deeply rooted in pre-modem times and borrowed heavily from 
religious traditions. On the theory of political religion see for example Philippe Burrin, 
Political Religion: The Relevance of a Concept, in: History and Memory 9 (1997), pp. 
321-349. - The thesis of the importance of the Orthodox legacy for the emergence of 
Bolshevism in Russia was formulated and successfully widespread already long ago by 
Nikolai Berdiaev, The Origins ofRussian Communism, London 1937. 
41 Philippe Burrin distinguishes two major currents within the theory of „political religion." 
First a „phenomenological" approach, stressing similarities of symbolic practises of 
religion on the one and totalitarian systems on the other band and second a functional 
approach arguing that the mass movements of the twentieth century fulfilled similar 
social and political functions like previously religions did. See Burrin, Political Religion. 
42 The importance of the movement of Bolshevik „God-builders" (,,bogostroitel'i") for the 
emergence of the Lenin cult is a highly disputed issue among historians. Whereas Nina 
Tumarkin draws a line of continuity from the years 1907-11 when Bolsheviks like Krasin 
and Lunacharskii were part of the "God-builder-movement" and the first peak of the 
Lenin cult in 1924, Benno Ennker questions the importance of these traditions. See Nina 
Tumarkin, Religion, Bolshevism, and the Origins of the Lenin Cult, in: The Russian 
Review 40 (1981), pp. 35-46 and Ennker, Anfänge, pp. 534-555. On the dispute see 
Stites, Bolshevik Ritual Building in the 1920s, pp. 295-300; Hildermeier, Geschichte der 
Sowjetunion, p. 326. 
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Stalin - or that they used the vocabulary and symbolic practiced deliberately to 
communicate successfully with the masses of illiterate people in their country .43 
Tue addressees of the cult on the other side, who apparently did not understand 
the abstract idea of Lenin's monumental propaganda, could handle the Lenin 
cult because it matched their traditional vision of the political and the religious 
world. lt is important to emphasize in this context that the symbolic order of the 
new regime did not fully succeed to replace, neither the traditional system of 
religious and pagan beliefs nor the monarchical psychology of the people. 
Notwithstanding the efforts of the communists to extinguish all forms of 
religious practices, in fact the cultural systems of Bolshevism and Orthodoxy 
co-existed in Russia for a long time. In everyday life of ordinary Russian 
citizens the new holidays of the Red Calendar did not replace but enrich the 
traditional circle of the religious year. The group of newly established symbolic 
leaders and heroes did not substitute but supplement the traditional pantheon. 
The result was a new syncretism in symbolic practices and rituals of the 
common people which allowed the veneration of saint Sergei of Radonezh and 
Vladimir Il'ich Lenin at the same time. 
Despite the fact that there are indeed a number of astonishing similarities 
between traditional Russian and new Bolshevik veneration of outstanding 
individuals, one should not ignore a number of major differences. First of all, 
the Lenin cult was and remained to be a part of the symbolic system of 
Bolshevism which was constructed as an anti-thesis and a counter-ideology to 
all forms of religious belief. The conservation of Lenin's body was not 
communicated as a result of any kind of religious miracle but as a proof for the 
supremacy and success of (secular) Soviet science.44 Despite the fact that one of 
the pivotal slogans of the Lenin cult tried to make the Soviet citizens believe 
that "Lenin is more alive than all living beings," Bolshevism did not 
communicate any metaphysical truth. All promises which were made to the 
believers of the new ideology applied to the development of the terrestrial 
world. 
Even if Lenin at first glance resembled a saint of the Orthodox Church, the 
veneration of his person and his relics served completely different purposes. 
"The use of religious vocabular,Y is not [necessarily] an attestation of the 
religiosity of those who speak. "4 True Bolsheviks did not call their children 
"Vladlen" because they expected divine protection from the founder of the 
Bolshevik party but because they wanted to express their loyalty with the new 
43 Malte Rolf, Zwischen antikirchlichem Gegenfest und volksreligiöser Festtradition. Fest-
kultur, Religion und Stalinismus in Sowjetrußland vor dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, in: Jahr-
bücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 52,4 (2004), pp. 494-513, p. 513. 
44 Ennker, Anfänge, p. 320. 
45 Jörg Baberowski, Stalinismus und Religion, in: Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 
52, 4 (2004), pp. 482-493, quotation p. 490. 
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political system. People were drawn to the mausoleum on Red Square in 
Moscow not for spiritual reasons but out of a combined sense of political duty 
and fascination, or even morbid curiosity. Portraits of the founder of the first 
socialist state in the world which were fixed in so-called "Lenin corners" were 
not the object of religious worship but a way to express allegiance with the new 
system. The Lenin cult was less an actual substitute for religion than a party 
effort to fuse religious and political rituals to mobilize the population and to 
legitimize the new regime. 
